Contemporary Conflict in Manipur

Himanshu Roy

To fully comprehend the roots of the ongoing conflict in Manipur, it is essential to revisit the region’s political history. The historical experience of Manipur has created a distinctive socio-political consciousness, which often finds itself at odds with national narratives. For centuries, Manipur functioned as a sovereign kingdom with its own administrative and cultural institutions. The British intervention, and later the merger with India, significantly altered its political trajectory.

The circumstances surrounding the 1949 merger are often described as coercive. The then Maharaja, Bodhachandra Singh, was summoned to Shillong where he signed the Merger Agreement, reportedly under pressure. This undermined the democratic mandate of the people of Manipur, as the existing elected legislative assembly was neither consulted nor allowed to function. The subsequent reduction of Manipur to a centrally administered Part C state not only diluted its autonomy but also instilled a lasting sense of political grievance among its people.

Adding to these tensions was the imposition of AFSPA in 1958, which granted sweeping powers to the armed forces. While the intention was to curb insurgency, the act led to widespread allegations of human rights violations, particularly extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and sexual violence. The infamous case of Thangjam Manorama and the resulting protests led by Meira Paibis (women torch-bearers) brought international attention to the plight of Manipuris under AFSPA. Yet, despite recommendations from national human rights bodies, the Act continues to be enforced in parts of the state, deepening the trust deficit.

Unlike other princely states, Manipur had a democratically elected assembly under the Manipur State Constitution Act, 1947. The sudden dissolution of this assembly and the imposition of a centrally administered regime without broad consultation sowed seeds of resentment. The denial of full statehood until 1972 and the continued deployment of special laws like the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) have only reinforced the sense of alienation.

Insurgency became a natural fallout of this alienation. Various groups, including the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), emerged with secessionist demands. These insurgent groups found fertile ground among the youth, who were disillusioned by unemployment, corruption, and perceived neglect by the central and state governments. While counter-insurgency operations have reduced their influence, the insurgency-homeland politics nexus remains potent.

Homeland politics, particularly among the Nagas and Kukis, continues to destabilise the region. The Naga demand for Greater Nagalim and the Kuki aspiration for a separate administrative unit often clash with Meitei concerns about territorial integrity. These demands are not just political; they are deeply rooted in cultural memory and ethno-historical narratives. The overlapping territorial claims of Nagas and Kukis in the hills further complicate negotiations and peace processes.

Social Context
The contemporary ethnic conflict is a legacy of the past that has been festering for the past half-century. The judgement of the High Court of Manipur in 2023 just blew up the latent fire. The three main social groups–ethnic and non-ethnic–Meitei, Kuki and the Naga have their distinctive cultural identities and topographical locations. While the Meiteis are mostly located in the valley, the hills are occupied by the Kukis and the Nagas with their ethnic linkages in Myanmar. The common border which runs along for 398 km is porous and thickly forested. Only a stretch of approximately 15 km is fenced near the Moreh border gate on both the sides of the entrance gate to Myanmar. The citizens of both the countries can enter into each other’s territories up to approximately 15 km. The valley in Manipur comprises approximately 10 percent of the state’s territory divided into six districts with approximately 60 percent of the population. The hills comprise 90 per cent of the territory with 10 districts and 41 per cent of the ethnic population. It has 78 percent of the forest cover. Its density is 44 persons per sq km while that of the valley is 631 persons per square km. The valley has a mixed population of all the ethnic and non-ethnic groups but is majorly dominated by the Meiteis. The density is largely due to better weather conditions and fertile flat irrigable land that sustains the livelihood. Hills, in contrast, have inhospitable weather with low-yielding terrace cultivation that makes residents’ lives tough. This natural distinction impacts the social groups in their culture and psyche, and brings in latent differences in their perceptions towards reservations and new opportunities in contemporary changing times. The growth of poppy–the lucrative item–cultivation in the hills and in the Myanmarese territories, added fire to the local aspirations among the Manipuris, both in terms of desire for better livelihood and opportunities for upward social mobility through instant ill-gotten narcotic wealth.

The porous 398-kilometre border with Myanmar further complicates the situation. Only a small stretch near the Moreh border gate is fenced, allowing for unchecked movement of people, goods, and illegal substances. This region has become a hotbed for narcotics trafficking, particularly poppy cultivation, which has replaced traditional farming in several Kuki and Naga-dominated areas. The “War on Drugs” campaign launched by the Manipur government has faced stiff resistance in these regions, where the drug economy has created a new elite class that exerts both economic and political influence.

The uneven application of land ownership laws and the distinction between Scheduled Tribes and non-Scheduled Tribes have further deepened mistrust. While STs, including Kukis and Nagas, can own land anywhere in the state, including in the valley, Meiteis are restricted from owning land in the hill areas. This legal asymmetry has led to accusations of encroachment, demographic manipulation, and ethnic marginalisation.

Education and health infrastructure also remain highly uneven. While Imphal boasts of universities, colleges, and hospitals, most hill districts suffer from inadequate facilities. This disparity reinforces feelings of marginalisation and pushes the youth toward radical ideologies or out-migration. A more equitable allocation of resources and decentralised governance through empowered autonomous district councils is needed to address this imbalance.

The demand for Scheduled Tribe status by Meiteis also deserves a nuanced discussion. While Meiteis argue that it would ensure constitutional safeguards and access to opportunities, hill communities fear it would dilute their rights and lead to further encroachment. A transparent dialogue, perhaps mediated by a neutral central committee, is essential to evaluate the demand on merit and in the context of historical injustices.

Regional Disparities
The state’s geography (See Map) has played a key role in shaping its social dynamics. The valley1, which constitutes only about 10 percent of the land area, houses nearly 60 percent of the population, mostly the Meiteis. In contrast, the surrounding hills cover 90 percent of the area but are sparsely populated and primarily inhabited by the Kukis and Nagas, many of whom share ethnic ties with groups across the border in Myanmar. The demographic concentration in the valley is driven by its fertile lands and more hospitable climate, making it the socio-economic hub of the state.

On the other hand, the hills are marked by underdevelopment, poor infrastructure, and reliance on shifting cultivation. The disparity in development and resources has translated into differences in political aspirations and economic priorities. While the Meiteis dominate the state’s political landscape and aspire for greater representation in national politics, the hill tribes continue to assert their demand for autonomy and protection of their land and identity.

Economic development in Manipur has been heavily skewed. While the valley region, particularly Imphal, has benefitted from relatively better infrastructure, education, and healthcare services, the hills continue to lag behind. This disparity fuels perceptions of exclusion and neglect, making the hill communities more receptive to secessionist narratives and demands for separate administration.

Agriculture remains the primary livelihood in both regions, but farming in the hills is constrained by terrain, climate, and lack of irrigation. The govern-ment’s efforts to transition from jhum (shifting) cultivation to settled farming have seen limited success. Meanwhile, the lack of industrial investment, high unemployment among youth, and poor connectivity deter long-term development. The state’s economic isolation, compounded by its geographical remoteness, calls for special policy attention that transcends tokenism.

In the Kukis and Nagas areas, and in the adjoining Myanmar, poppy cultivation has gradually replaced their traditional cultivation. The new wealth has created a seminary elite which is changing their lifestyle and spatial and social mobility. One of the spin-offs of it is the purchase of properties by the Kukis and the Nagas in the Meitei-dominated valley. Their scheduled tribe status ensures better opportunities for jobs and property. In contrast, the Meiteis cannot purchase properties in their(Nagas and Kukis) areas as these are scheduled territories; they have neither the benefit of the quota in the government jobs. This dichotomy in everyday social life has bred latent frustration and cumulative anger. The judgement of the Manipur High Court in 2023 to consider recommending Meitei for reservation in government jobs was a ray of hope for them.

Crisis Of Representation and Political Realignment
Since 2015, there has been a renewed demand from various Kuki groups for a separate administration (State/Union Territory), as observed by M Amarjeet Singh,2 consequent to the three bills, namely the protection of Manipur peoples (PMB, 2015), the Manipur Land Revenues and Land Reforms (MLR&LR) (7th Amendement) 2015, and the Manipur Shops and establishment (MS&E) (Second Amendment) Bill 2015 passed by the state legislative assembly in August 2015. As a result, violent protests erupted in Churachandpur, a Kuki-inhabited town leading to the death of 9 protesters. Many hill-based groups had labelled the bills anti-tribal. But, there was no opposition from the valley-based groups. The demand of some Meiteis groups for the recognition of Meiteis as the Scheduled tribes was opposed by several groups including the Kukis. The state government has neither supported nor opposed the demand. In March 2023, the Manipur High Court directed the state government to consider the inclusion of the Meitei community into the scheduled tribe list within a period of four weeks (the directive has now been revoked). The directive further escalated the tense situation.

The 2023 High Court directive to consider ST status for the Meiteis was seen by them as a long-overdue correction of historical injustice. For the hill communities, however, it was perceived as a threat to their constitutional protections, triggering widespread protests and violence. The resulting clashes displaced tens of thousands of people and led to the destruction of homes and infrastructure, particularly in mixed-population areas.
The situation is exacerbated by the failure of governance. Successive governments have been unable to implement inclusive policies that address the developmental needs of both valley and hill areas. Although schemes like “Go to Hills” and the creation of tribal museums and medical colleges in hill districts are commendable, they have not fundamentally altered the perception of bias and neglect. Allegations of corruption, nepotism, and selective implementation of welfare schemes continue to plague public trust.

The electoral politics of Manipur have also mirrored national trends, with the ruling party at the Centre often forming the government in the state. The Congress ruled the state for decades, but since 2017, the BJP has gained prominence. While the BJP-led government has initiated several development projects, its inability to quell ethnic violence and address the demands of all communities equitably has raised questions about its governance model.

Civil society, traditionally a strong force in the northeast, has struggled to play a mediatory role in the current conflict. The polarisation is so intense that even peace initiatives are viewed through the lens of ethnic allegiance. Churches, student unions, and local NGOs have been active in providing relief but have found it difficult to bridge the trust deficit between the communities.

Despite the proliferation of regional parties and increased political awareness, Manipur continues to suffer from a crisis of representation. Political loyalties frequently shift with changing tides at the Centre. Many political leaders have changed parties multiple times, driven more by personal gain than ideology. As a result, policy continuity suffers, and public trust in democratic processes erodes.

The Scheduled Tribe demand by the Meitei community has emerged in this political backdrop. While proponents highlight historical discrimination and the need for affirmative action, opponents see it as a ploy for economic advantage and territorial expansion into hill areas. This demand, therefore, has not only legal implications but also emotional and existential ones for the hill communities.

Cross-Border Dynamics and Strategic Implications
A significant concern is the changing demography due to cross-border migration from Myanmar. Following the military coup in Myanmar, a large number of Chin refugees have entered Manipur. While the Kukis view them as ethnic kin, other groups see them as illegal migrants altering the demographic balance. This perception has fuelled support for a National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Manipur, similar to the one in Assam. The proposed fencing of the entire India-Myanmar border and the suspension of the Free Movement Regime are steps in this direction but are opposed by hill communities who have familial ties across the border.

The poppy economy deserves special attention. Beyond being a law-and-order issue, it is a symptom of deeper economic malaise. The lack of viable livelihoods in the hills has made poppy cultivation an attractive alternative. Without a sustainable economic development plan, any crackdown is likely to be met with resistance. The creation of alternative income-generating opportunities, such as horticulture, tourism, and agro-based industries, is essential.

Manipur’s location at the edge of India’s northeastern frontier, sharing borders with Myanmar, makes it strategically significant. However, the porous border is a double-edged sword. While it allows cultural continuity and economic exchange, it also enables transnational crimes like drug smuggling, arms trafficking, and the movement of insurgents.

The Free Movement Regime (FMR), which allowed unrestricted movement across a 16-kilometre border zone, was designed to preserve traditional ties. However, misuse by criminal and militant elements has compelled the government to reconsider it. The ongoing fencing of the Indo-Myanmar border and the introduction of stricter protocols reflect this shift. But these measures have also alienated border communities that have familial and cultural ties across the border, especially among Kukis and Nagas.

Conclusion
Manipur’s future lies not in fragmentation but in inclusive federalism. A genuine peace framework must be participatory, involving all stakeholders including tribal councils, civil society, women’s groups, youth organisations, and faith-based institutions. Economic development plans must be context-specific and culturally sensitive, focusing on infrastructure, education, and livelihood generation. Conflict resolution in Manipur cannot be achieved through security measures alone. It requires a multi-pronged approach involving political dialogue, economic development, cultural recognition, and institutional reform. The state must recognise the multiplicity of identities and aspirations within its borders and craft policies that are inclusive, participatory, and just. The central government has a critical role to play in this process. It must act not as a partisan actor but as a constitutional guardian ensuring justice, equality, and peace. The deployment of additional security forces can only buy time; the real solution lies in addressing the root causes of conflict.

Moreover, institutions of justice must be made accessible and accountable. The slow pace of judicial review, lack of local participation in policy-making, and absence of grievance redressal mechanisms have contributed to the current impasse. Strengthening local governance, ensuring representation of all communities, and reforming the criminal justice system are imperative. There is also a pressing need for institutional reforms. Autonomous District Councils must be empowered not just on paper but through real financial devolution and capacity building. Electoral reforms that discourage defections and strengthen local governance would also help in stabilising the political landscape. Above all, the people of Manipur deserve justice, dignity, and peace. Achieving this will require not just administrative will but moral courage–from both state and society. Only then can Manipur fulfil its potential as a vibrant, pluralistic, and peaceful frontier of India.

Finally, the media and academia must play a constructive role in shaping narratives. Sensationalism and bias in reporting have often inflamed tensions. Instead, there is a need for informed, empathetic, and balanced discourse that acknowledges historical grievances while promoting reconciliation.

In conclusion, Manipur stands at a crossroads. Its rich cultural mosaic, strategic location, and resilient people offer immense potential. But to harness this potential, the state must rise above its divisions and embrace a future founded on justice, equity, and mutual respect. The journey will be arduous, but it is the only path to lasting peace and prosperity.

References
1    See M. Amarjeet Singh, Conflicts In Manipur, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, 2010, p.6.
2    See M. Amarjeet Singh, “Politics In Manipur” in Himanshu Roy (ed.), State Politics In Contemporary India, Palgrave, New Delhi, 2025 (forthcoming).

[Himanshu Roy, Professor, Centre for Political Studies, JNU]

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